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This essay reviews literature relating to war, economy, and technology 
(i.e., the material means of warfare), all of which are of great importance to 
the development of society. The relative importance of material vs. other 
factors is itself an interesting question. For example, Arther Ferrill regards 
human nature as combat-ready, and dates the emergence of warfare to a 
prehistoric Revolution in Military Affairs(RMA). 1 However, H. H. Turney-
High, seconded by John Keegan, traces warfare as an institution brought into 
being as a consequence of social organization, and possible only after crossing 
a "military horizon.''2 Even though they seem mutually exclusive, both views 
have considerable merit. The point this reviewer offers is that those who study 
warfare and society using a material focus miss much that's relevant, and those 
who omit the material likewise overlook many important factors. 
Studies of the material means of warfare and society vary widely in 
breadth. Some, like McNeill's The Pursuit of Power, depict a wide variety 
of experience over an extended period. Others, such as Robert Hardy's 
history of the longbow, concentrate on a relatively narrow subject.3 Some 
offer a broad survey of one period, such as Milward's War, Economy and 
Society, 1939-1945, or the Friedmans' The Future of War. Still others have 
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more modest ends, such as Overy's War and Economy in the Third Reich, 
or Milward's earlier work, The German Economy at War. 4 
Given the richness of the literature, which sample to consider must in the 
end depend on individual preference. However, it is fair to say interest in the 
study of technology, economy, and war increased dramatically in the 
twentieth century-which featured large-scale military-technical applica-
tions as well as fully mobilized economies committed to the conduct of total 
war. Within those studies, Nazi Germany has attracted considerable atten-
tion for a number ofreasons: (1) its articulated view of total war prior to 1939, 
(2) its clear defeat in the material dimensions of warfare despite successes 
in early campaigns, and (3) scholars' extensive access to Third Reich 
archives after 1945. 
The Pursuit of Power 
McNeill' s book is a magisterial treatment of a large, complex subject: 
methods for mobilizing resources for military purposes and the conse-
quences of using those methods. There are three main parts: the Chinese 
dead end, the successful European formula, and the breakdown of that 
formula in the twentieth century. 
According to the author, large-scale commercial markets became im-
portant around 1000 AD. First to enter the new age was China, which 
enjoyed huge technical and economic advantages. However, McNeill is 
primarily interested in China's failure to maintain its lead. The overarching 
explanation is the bureaucracy's ability to preserve its power at the expense 
of entrepreneurs and soldiers: " ... systematic restraints upon industrial 
expansion, commercial expansion, and military expansion were built into 
the Chinese system of political administration" (pp. 40-41 ). One might say 
success for Chinese bureaucracy meant eventual failure for China. 
McNeill focuses mainly on the European formula for military power, 
commercial success, and world domination. Knowledge of Chinese technol-
ogy and methods inevitably spread, Europeans being particularly successful 
in exploiting and improving them. Rivalries among European powers led to 
a number of experiments in military operations, organization, and equip-
ment-with "best practices" generally spreading. For example, various 
types of contractual arrangements for raising military forces proved less 
satisfactory than national administration; hence the bureaucratic rationaliza-
tion of warfare. Commercial markets proved more effective for arranging 
logistics; hence the commercialization of warfare. The economic, political, 
technical, and military dimensions of European statecraft were interlinked 
in one highly successful formula: "a self-reinforcing cycle in which military 
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organization sustained, and was sustained by, economic and political 
expansion ... " (p. 143). 
One logical culmination was industrialization of warfare, which began 
with military applications of steam engines and mass production. The 
Industrial Revolution greatly extended the horizons of military policy-
providing the economic wherewithal to raise and train large military forces; 
large quantities of goods to equip them well; and transport to get them 
quickly to distant theaters of operation. Like most successful practices, 
industrialized warfare spread to all major powers, leading among other 
things to the stalemate of 1914. Subsequent need for war materiel, in 
quantities too great and time periods too short for commercial markets to 
effectively respond, led to mobilization managed by national edict. Broadly 
speaking, war was "decommercialized." Command methods came to the 
fore during total war, and significant parts of the command apparatus 
remained in place in peacetime. 
At the same time, complexity of military-technical affairs meant erosion 
of rationality in military decisions. In support of that proposition, McNeill 
considers a gun-laying system for Royal Navy capital ships prior to World 
War I, in which an inferior model was chosen because the technical issues 
were beyond the ken of the main decisionmakers (pp. 295 ff.). A more 
fundamental challenge to rational management was the appearance of 
nuclear weapons, whose use would render moot any rational war aims. The 
author sees these developments as constituting a dead end for the European 
formula. The way around it is "political change .... The alternative appears to 
be sudden and total annihilation of the human species" (pp. 383, 384). 
McNeill presents an interesting narrative-well told and leading to a 
logical conclusion; however, even the most sweeping narratives have 
significant gaps. He frequently cites demographic pressures that drove 
major national policies. Similarly, he cites a demographic revolution in 
which the French "learned how to control births" some time after the 
Revolution of 1789 (p. 214). The reader is left to wonder how population 
pressures arose, and how societies then become self-sustaining. This seems 
to have been an excellent opportunity for McNeill to connect The Pursuit of 
Power with his earlier work, Plagues and Peoples. 5 But he does not do that. 
This is less a criticism of him than an indication that even works of this scale 
are inherently incomplete. 
More importantly, he appears to have been more wrong than incomplete. 
As The Pursuit of Power was published ( 1982), a new method of warfare was 
in development, centered on precision weapons and information (highly 
effective military force without mass destruction). With the new era has 
come a new literature, as is represented by The Future of War. 
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The Future of War 
This volume offers itself as a preview of technology and warfare in the 
twenty-first century-an "American epoch." There is a strong thread of 
technical determinism in the Friedmans' approach, revealed in statements 
such as "Great technologies permeate great civilizations" (p. 10). The 
distinctive American technology is the computer, whose military embodi-
ment is precision weaponry. Their narrative consists of three parts. First, the 
authors present their view of technology, warfare, and America's place in the 
world. Second, they make the case for obsolescence ("senility") of ballistic 
weapons from the previous, "European," epoch. Third, they offer us their 
vision of future warfare. 
However, there is more to their account than narrative and prediction. 
Theirs is a decidedly "realistic" view of the American world order and 
American interests. The United States is seen as a maritime state with 
interests in both the Atlantic and Pacific regions. Preservation of U.S. 
primacy implies control of the seas-which means, in turn, a strong interest 
in preventing any potential peer competitor in Eurasia the freedom to contest 
maritime supremacy. 
The authors also present a theory of the life cycle of military technolo-
gies, from inception to strategic significance to "senility." Senility gets most 
of the attention, as a condition in which so many resources are devoted to 
self-protection that offensive capabilities wither to insignificance. The story 
of David and Goliath is the illustrative parable. Goliath was heavily armed 
and heavily defended. If David had gotten close, Goliath would have won. 
David, of course, didn't do that, relying instead on simple technology, 
tactical agility, and (most important) outranging his opponent. This theory 
is applied to current military affairs to prove that tanks, manned aircraft, and 
aircraft carriers are senile weapons. 
Likewise, the Friedmans assert an ongoing "epochal change" in military 
affairs, as demonstrated in the Gulf War of 1991. Smart, precision munitions 
have replaced ballistic munitions. Furthermore, long-range precision strikes 
are now possible due to rapid integration of large amounts of combat 
information. They seem to view the change as something more than just 
another Revolution in Military Affairs (as discussed by Krepinevich), but 
less significant than the manifestation of a major change in the human 
material condition (the Tofflers).6 Consequently, successfully discarding 
old ideas and equipment when appropriate and without large social cost is 
necessary for military success. 
Finally, the authors predict weapons and technologies that will dominate 
future warfare and shape statecraft: (1) long-range, high-speed, brilliant 
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cruise missiles, (2) space-based reconnaissance and strike systems, and (3) 
a resurgent infantry. These changes are expected to have consequences well 
beyond the art of war. For example, the United States faces a sea-control 
dilemma related to the senility of the aircraft carrier. Space-centered means 
are offered as the solution, but the implications of space are not limited to 
military strategy: "Whoever controls space will control the ... oceans. Who-
ever controls the oceans will control...global commerce. Whoever 
controls ... commerce will be the wealthiest power .... Whoever is the 
wealthiest ... will control space" (p. 411 ). Also, the authors expect funda-
mental changes in the relations of military and society. Military forces will 
become small, professional and elite-more like knights than mass armies. 
Also, the advent of deep precision strike capabilities promises warfare 
conducted with minimal effect on populations-wars will be more like those 
fought in the eighteenth than in the twentieth century. 
The basic strength of the book is a coherent theory of military technol-
ogy, which leads to hypotheses about future warfare. However, reasonable 
people can draw different conclusions from the lessons of history, and hold 
different expectations about the future of war. The authors, perhaps of 
necessity, focus mainly on technology. In so doing, they implicitly assume 
an international order that may or may not persist until such time as their 
vision of future warfare can be realized. 7 
Their technical focus also leads to conclusions they think are self-
evident, but that aren't, really. New technologies are presumed to allow 
small, high-tech militaries such as those of Israel and Singapore to readily 
compete with larger powers like the United States. This ignores one essential 
point: significant economies of scale. One example is the complex featuring 
hypersonic cruise missiles and space-based sensors that the authors posit. 
The missiles would be launched from an advanced artillery piece, which 
costs about $7 billion. The marginal cost of the associated "Hypersonic 
Aerospace Weapons" would then be relatively small. As with all such classic 
economies of scale, getting half the capability entails considerably more 
than half the cost-a major deterrent to entry for small states. 
Some other propositions are also open to question. The David and 
Goliath story illustrates both the book's virtues and weaknesses. One virtue 
is a definite thesis articulated clearly and imaginatively. A weakness is that 
the example cited is not fully consistent with military history. Heavy infantry 
units, Goliath's heirs, were a mainstay of most ancient armies, while the light 
missile troops, David's heirs, were almost always relegated to a secondary 
role. 
Similarly, David and Goliath could describe English longbowmen 
against French knights during the Hundred Years' War. Yet, while knights 
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in plate annor were well into senility, their obsolescence is not the whole 
story. English battlefield prowess was built on combined anns: infantry, 
cavalry, and bowmen.8 A more useful lesson is that new weapons are used 
most effectively in proper combination with older weapons. That said, 
however, the Friedmans have written a thoughtful and interesting book. 
World War II: War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945; War and 
Economy in the Third Reich 
Alan S. Milward has written what is arguably the seminal work for 
modem studies of society and the material means of war. This is a broad 
study of the economic policies of the major powers during World War II, and 
in it, Milward pays more attention to the Axis powers, especially Germany.9 
He takes the interesting, perhaps controversial, view that warfare can be part 
of a rational pursuit of prospective economic benefits. He argues persua-
sively that such calculations were significant factors in the German and 
Japanese decisions to go to war. Both countries were intent on forming large, 
closed, autarkic trading blocs with themselves as the manufacturing centers. 
The book's main concern is national strategies, their execution, and the 
effects of their execution. Each major power arrived at a "strategic synthe-
sis" with military, economic, and political dimensions. For Germany, the 
strategic synthesis was Blitzkrieg. The military dimension called for a series 
of short, mobile, decisive campaigns. The political dimension was built on 
expansion through the opportunistic choice of such campaigns. The appro-
priate economic component of that synthesis was an emphasis on existing 
inventories ("annament in width") and flexibility in annaments produc-
tion-which meant considerable sacrifice in efficiency. Reflecting similar 
circumstances, Japan reached a similar strategic synthesis. 
Britain started with a defensive emphasis on air and naval forces for the 
first phase of a grim, prolonged struggle. The intention was to win eventually 
by outproducing Germany, with help from the Empire and the United States. 
In the late 1930s, the Soviet Union embarked on a policy of rebuilding its 
military infrastructure after Stalin's purges. The United States began with 
the aim of preserving its neutrality-which proved increasingly untenable 
after September 1939. The basic choices then ranged from arming itself or 
arming those fighting the Axis. The eventual choice was to do considerable 
amounts of both. 
The execution of German strategy receives much attention. With the 
failure of Blitzkrieg, Germany switched to modes of production consistent 
with a long war. However, Germany's "annament in depth" emphasized 
high-quality weapons, rather than competing directly with the Allies' 
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quantity. Nonetheless, war production increased steadily and rather dramati-
cally until the collapse that began in 1944. 
During World War II, all nations faced a common problem in executing 
their strategies: non-market allocation of resources in highly complex, 
sophisticated economies. Results were decidedly mixed. In many cases, 
execution of policy differed significantly from national intentions. A prob-
lem unique to Germany and Japan was exploitation of their occupied areas, 
which each did with varying success. 
Execution of a strategic synthesis included disruption of the enemy's 
economy-described broadly as economic warfare. Measures included 
surface blockade, submarine warfare, preemptive purchases, coercion of 
neutral suppliers, and strategic bombing. Despite conspicuous successes 
such as bombing German synthetic oil production and interdicting Japanese 
sea lanes, the overall record was mixed. The basic reason was the same as 
for the mixed results in economic control. Both approaches required detailed 
knowledge of complex industrial economies. 
War and Economy in the Third Reich 
R. J. Overy takes on the same general subject as Milward. His book is 
really a collection of essays, with the whole both interesting and coherent.10 
Its chapters develop four interrelated themes: the course of economic 
recovery in the 1930s, the relationship between the regime and business, the 
nature of prewar rearmament, and the operation of the war economy. 
Recovery emphasized employment, with civilian programs receiving 
high priority until 1936, followed by a strong shift to rearmament. The Nazi 
regime had a complex record of cooperation and friction with German 
business, with the details varying according to the industry, the individual 
firms and overtime. Like Milward, Overy provides a thoughtful analysis, but 
arrives at conclusions that are sometimes strikingly different. 11 
His most important, and most interesting, theme involves the nature and 
operation of the war economy. General war came too soon because much 
investment involved infrastructure to support military production, which 
was still in progress in September 1939. Although there were production 
bottlenecks by 1936, the economy was extensively mobilized by 1939 
thanks to Hitler's reliance on command methods. With consumption well on 
its way to a minimum level at the outbreak of war, it was increasingly 
difficult to further decrease it later. 
The war economy evolved in three phases. In the first (1939 to 1941), 
additional resources committed to military industries did not result in much 
additional production. For example, 50% more labor in the aircraft industry 
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resulted in only a 15% increase in production. This occurred for a number 
of reasons: military infrastructure investments were incomplete; assimilat-
ing occupied territories was costly; there were uncertainties regarding the 
future direction of the war; defense suppliers faced perverse incentives and 
acted accordingly; and military and political authorities could not effectively 
coordinate their efforts. 
The second phase (1941 to 1944) featured increasingly effective coor-
dination by technical experts. With direct backing from Hitler and a central 
planning apparatus, the technocrats rationalized production (for cost mini-
mization) and concentrated facilities (for economies of scale). The result 
was a dramatic increase in war production. 
The third phase (1944 to 1945) marks the economic collapse that 
accompanied rapid declines in German military fortunes on all five fronts. 
Overy attributes much more importance to strategic bombing than is 
currently fashionable, asserting that it caused disruptions of supply chains, 
with attendant losses in efficiency. Bombing also necessitated the dispersion 
of facilities, negating economies of scale. Overy regards strategic bombing 
as having directly undermined the basis of Germany's production successes 
and thus was well designed to disrupt its war economy. 
Even relatively narrow studies can reach differing conclusions. 
Milward's Blitzkrieg thesis holds that the German war economy, "arming 
in width," reflected a strategy of sequential short wars. While the strategy 
was working, the leadership felt no reason to put the economy on a total 
war footing-since clearly inferior opponents would be chosen.12 There-
fore, there was a certain lack of seriousness about war production, as well 
as uncertainty about what was needed. As a result, production fluctuated 
considerably in composition, but changed little in total until the Reich 
faced a long war. Production was then adapted to counter that of the Allies, 
and only then did Germany undertake an "armament in depth" approach 
to a long war. 
Overy offers a decidedly different view. According to him, the German 
economy was well on its way to mobilization by 1939, with large-scale 
transfers of productive resources already complete but with remarkably little 
increase in production. With the rationalization described above, production 
increased dramatically between 1941 and 1944 even though committed 
resources changed relatively little. 
Making sense of these conflicting views is difficult for those less 
familiar with the subject. There are points of congruence, disagreements as 
to facts, and differences of interpretation. One point of congruence concerns 
production uncertainties. Overy cites the uncertainties on national policy as 
one of many reasons why German military production was so slow to 
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respond to increased resources. In a similar vein, Milward cites the oppor-
tunistic nature of national strategy as the unavoidable cause of uncertainty 
about needs for military equipment and the attendant inefficiencies in 
military production. However, Milward believes uncertainty was central to 
explaining production levels, while Overy seems to regard it as secondary. 
There appears to be no consensus regarding the facts. Milward asserts 
that German women were largely left out of the war effort, due primarily to 
Nazi ideology. Overy states that there was an extensive increase in female 
labor force participation, much of it accomplished by 1939. Milward 
concludes that failure of Blitzkrieg entailed significant increases in guns 
at the expense of butter. Overy believes there was little butter left to be 
had at all after 1939. Those favoring Overy will be impressed with his 
consideration of the German experience before 1939. Those favoring 
Milward will note definite evidence of reductions in consumption after 1941 
(e.g., Table 9, p. 78). 
Finally, there are differences in interpretation. There are, for example, 
differing explanations for the increase in German production after 1941. 
Overy's explanation centers on efficiencies (both technical and economic), 
while Milward emphasizes increased inputs. This leads, among other things, 
to differing interpretations of the effectiveness of strategic bombing. Milward 
views it as a blunt instrument that had its successes but could largely be 
countered by increased mobilization of the economy and other measures 
readily available until major losses in the land theaters intervened to cause 
collapse. Overy views bombing as a strategy that worked well to counter 
rationalization of war production. 
A Few Closing Thoughts 
What emerges from this glimpse of the literature, whether it is sweeping 
in scope or relatively focused, is the difficulty of encompassing the subject 
and reaching definite conclusions. Works like McNeill's are incomplete-
not because his reach exceeds his grasp but because of the inherent difficulty 
in describing the relationship between the material means of warfare and 
society. This is both complex and difficult. 
But the game is still worth the candle. Especially now. We have almost 
certainly entered a period of rapid changes in military affairs, driven primarily 
by an array of developing technologies. The Gulf War of 1991 made clear that 
there has been a major change in the material means of warfare, thanks to the 
microchip. 13 The Friedmans project these changes into the future. 
However, there are other possibilities for what will spur the next 
Revolution in Military Affairs, or intensify this one, ranging from 
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nanotechnologies, to biogenetics, and (conceivably) a high-tech, neo-Maoist 
art of war. Therefore, serious efforts to understand the intersections between the 
material means of war and society are especially critical. These four books do 
this, and thus present us with useful models-their "strategic syntheses"-
for how this can best be done. 
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Michael A. Bellesiles, Arming America: The Origins of a Na-
tional Gun Culture. New York: Knopf, 2000. Pp. 603. $30.00, 
hardcover. 
This is an important book, but also a disillusioning and disorienting one. 
Michael Bellesiles seeks to dispel the agglomeration of myth, history, 
pseudotraditions, and legalisms that have encrusted the Second Amendment 
and jelled in the form of the wacky cult of the gun with which we are 
presently burdened-to disarm, intellectually at least, what he views as 
a gunslinger nation. Predictably, his relative degree of success or failure 
thus far has been interpreted largely in partisan terms-praise that 
borders on fawning from the academic left, and a chorus of Bronx cheers 
from the fans of firearms. From my own perspective the book defies easy 
evaluation. It takes a mighty whack at America's gun culture and gives 
every appearance of obliterating substantial chunks, yet it not only fails 
in other respects but reveals a calculated tendentiousness that under-
mines confidence in the entire enterprise. Complicating analysis still 
further, Bellesiles, unlike many contemporary American historians, is 
a good, even gifted, writer capable of weaving a web of solid research, 
serious misinterpretation, stunning insights, and a pinch of pure balder-
dash into a case that looks as solid as a two-ton safe. It's not. But it is also 
quite compelling. Is this history or advocacy journalism with lots of 
footnotes? I'm not sure. 
Bellesiles uses an impressive, though not necessarily definitive, body of 
evidence to make several key points: gun ownership and general familiarity 
with firearms during the colonial and early national periods were dramati-
cally lower than previously assumed; until the Civil War, Americans, rather 
than romanticizing guns, were largely indifferent to them; and that the militia 
system, intended as an effective substitute for a standing army, was instead 
a grotesque and unmitigated failure. Cumulatively it amounts to an all-court 
press on the NRA credo, except that it leaks. 
